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Abstract— This paper analyzes the impact of peer effects
on electricity consumption of a network of rational, utility-
maximizing users. Users derive utility from consuming elec-
tricity as well as consuming less energy than their neighbors.
However, a disutility is incurred for consuming more than their
neighbors. To maximize the profit of the load-serving entity that
provides electricity to such users, we develop a two-stage game-
theoretic model, where the entity sets the prices in the first
stage. In the second stage, consumers decide on their demand
in response to the observed price set in the first stage so as
to maximize their utility. To this end, we derive theoretical
statements under which such peer effects reduce aggregate user
consumption. Further, we obtain expressions for the resulting
electricity consumption and profit of the load serving entity for
the case of perfect price discrimination and a single price under
complete information, and approximations under incomplete
information. Simulations suggest that exposing only a selected
subset of all users to peer effects maximizes the entity’s profit.
I. INTRODUCTION
Energy efficiency programs have emerged as a viable
resource to yield economic benefits to utility systems and to
reduce the amount of greenhouse gas emissions. Demand-
side management aims to modify consumer demand through
financial incentive schemes and to induce behavioral changes
through education. Specifically, users are offered rewards
to conserve energy during peak hours or to shift usage
to off-peak times. With communications and information
technology constantly improving, which are characteristic
elements of today’s smart grid, demand-side management
technologies are becoming increasingly feasible.
Previous academic work by psychologists, political scien-
tists, and behavioral economists has found that social com-
parisons can have a significant impact on people’s behavior,
exploiting the willingness of individuals to conform to a
standard, receive social acclaim, or simply the belief that
other people’s choices are informative in the presence of
limited or imperfect information [1], [2].
Motivated by this line of academic work and the pressing
need to improve energy efficiency, various companies and
groups, for instance OPOWER, have conducted randomized
control trials to investigate the impact of peer effects on
energy consumption of residential households by sending out
quarterly energy reports (so called Home Energy Reports)
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to users with a comparison of their usage to their closest
neighbors [3]. While all experiments unanimously found an
average reduction among the highest consuming users of
around 1-2% [4], ambiguous results were found among low
consumers, with one study reporting a “boomerang effect”,
that is, an increase of energy demand among the most
efficient households.
Network effects in social networks and platforms often
exhibit positive externalities, capturing the intuitive fact
that an increased amount of platform activity promotes a
local increase in platform activity. From a game-theoretic
perspective, it is known that an analysis of games under
such strategic complements admits well-behaved solutions
if utility functions are supermodular with parameters drawn
from a lattice [5], [6]. Examples for such games can be found
in modeling technology adoption, human capital decisions,
and criminal and social networks [7]. The opposite effect,
that is, in games of strategic substitutes where an increased
amount of activity leads to local reductions of activity, is
observed in information sharing and the provision of public
goods [8]. However, since utility functions in this setting tend
to lose the feature of supermodularity, finding equilibria is
an inherently hard problem [9], and so these settings have
been significantly less studied.
In an attempt to characterize the most influential players in
a network, [10] develops a quadratic model with continuous
action spaces, a parameterization which we employ in this
paper. Other research directions aiming at understanding
the impact of network effects on social phenomena include
diffusion models for the spread of information with the goal
of influence maximization [11], repeated games to learn
user interactions over time [12], or the analysis of systemic
risk and stability [13] in financial networks. The problem
of profit maximization of a monopolist selling a divisible
good, which is closely related with our work, has been
investigated in [14], where the authors assume a constant
marginal cost of production. However, to the best of our
knowledge, a modeling approach for the impact of peer
effects on energy consumption, whose generation typically
has quadratic marginal cost, has yet to be formulated.
In this paper, we propose a two-stage game-theoretic
model for the energy consumption of a network of users,
serviced by the load-serving entity that is obligated to cover
the households’ energy demand at all times. We analytically
solve for the equilibria of this game under full information of
the network structure and users’ parameters to characterize
the influence of peer effects on aggregate consumption and
utility profit, for both the case of perfect price discrimination
and a single price valid for all users. For the case of
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incomplete information, we obtain approximations of the
utility’s profit, user consumptions, and the optimal pricing
scheme. Further, we analyze the profit-maximization problem
by selecting the best subset of users to be exposed to peer
effects, and present a heuristic solution to this NP-hard
selection problem. Lastly, we provide theoretical statements
on the properties of users which ensure that the consumption
under peer effects is reduced.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows:
Section II presents the two-stage game-theoretic model be-
tween the utility and the network of consumers and derives
consumption and price equilibria. Based on this model,
Section III presents various theorems on the reduction of
consumption in response to the peer effect as well as on the
effect of uncertainty of the network structure on the optimal
profit. Section IV compares the utility’s profit under the
pricing schemes derived in Section II. Next, the challenge
of maximizing the utility’s profit by imposing a binary
constraint on the number of users exposed to peer effects is
formulated and solved with a heuristic approach in Section
V. Section VI concludes the paper. All proofs are relegated
to the Appendix.
II. GAME-THEORETIC MODEL
A. Players
Define the set of consumers as I = {1, . . . , n}. Let
W ∈ Rn×n define the interaction matrix which describes the
network links and strengths between users. More precisely,
let wij ∈ [0, 1] denote the strength of influence of user j
on i. We assume wii = 0 ∀ i ∈ I and normalize the row
sums,
∑
j∈I wij = 1 ∀ i ∈ I. Each element wij > 0 in W
corresponds to a directed edge from agent j to agent i, that
is, the adjacency matrix G of the resulting directed graph
is the transpose of W . Each user i derives a utility ui ∈ R
from consuming xi units of electricity as follows:
ui = aixi − bix2i − pixi + γixi
∑
j∈I
wijxj − xi
 . (1)
In (1), ai and bi denote user-specific parameters to describe
the concave and increasing direct utility from consuming xi
units of electricity, and pi denotes the unit price set by the
utility. The last term captures the strategic complementarity
between user i and its neighbors. It is positive if user i
consumes less than the average of its neighbors, and vice
versa. The difference between the average consumption and
the user consumption is scaled by a proportionality constant
γi and the consumption level xi.
Since each user consumes xi units of electricity at unit
price pi, the utility’s profit reads as follows:
Π =
∑
i∈I
pixi − cix2i , (2)
where the marginal cost of production 2cixi is assumed to
be linear in the production quantity xi, which is a standard
and often made assumption. For expositional ease, we further
assume that the utility generates electricity itself and does not
procure it from the wholesale electricity market. Relaxing
this assumption would introduce uncertainty in wholesale
prices, a problem which is outside the scope of this paper.
B. Two-Stage Game
To model the hierarchy between the utility, which acts as
a monopolist that has the power to set prices, and the users,
we formulate a two-stage game as follows:
1) The utility determines the optimal price p∗ so as
to maximize its profit by taking into account users’
consumption decisions as a function of any particular
price vector p, that is,
p∗ = arg max
p≥0
∑
i∈I
pixi(pi)− cix2i (pi) (3)
2) Each agent observes the price p∗i and x−i and con-
sumes x∗i units of electricity so as to maximize her
utility, that is, x∗i = arg maxxi≥0 ui(xi,x−i, γi,W ).
We will solve this two-stage game by finding a subgame
perfect equilibrium for the cases of perfect price discrimina-
tion and a single price for all users. We also differentiate
between the full-information case where the utility has
knowledge about all {ai}ni=1 and {bi}ni=1, and the case in
which only their expectations E[a] and E[b] are known.
C. Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium
Assumption 1. ai > pi and bi > γi ∀ i ∈ I.
Theorem 1. Given the price vector p and consumption
vector x−i, the utility maximizing response of user i is
x∗i =
ai − pi + γi
∑
j∈I wijxj
2(bi + γi)
. (4)
Further, {x∗1, . . . , x∗n} constitute a unique Nash Equilibrium
of the second stage game.
Recall that wii = 0 ∀ i ∈ I, which allows the right hand
side of (4) to depend on x−i only. Assumption 1 is necessary
to ensure that (4) is indeed a maximum attained at a non-
negative value. With the definitions B := diag (2b1, . . . , 2bn)
and Γ := diag (γ1, . . . , γn), (4) can be rewritten as
x∗ = (B + 2Γ− ΓW )−1 (a− p). (5)
Definition 1 (Katz-Bonacich Centrality [15], [16]). Given
the adjacency matrix G, the weight vector w, and the scalar
0 ≤ α < 1/ρ(G), where ρ(G) denotes the spectral radius of
G, the weighted Katz-Bonacich Centrality is defined as
Kw(G,α) = (I − αG)−1w =
∞∑
k=0
(αG)kw. (6)
The centrality of a particular node i can be interpreted as
the sum of total number of walks from i to its neighbors
discounted exponentially by α and weighted by wi.
For the special case γ1 = . . . = γn = γ, and noting that
G = W>, (5) can be rewritten in terms of the weighted
Katz-Bonacich Centrality:
x∗ = (B + 2γI)−1
(
I − γW>(B + 2γI)−1)−1 (a− p)
= (B + 2γI)−1Ka−p(W>(B + 2γI)−1, γ)
We note that (B + 2Γ− ΓW ) is strictly diagonally dominant
for all γ ≥ 0, with positive diagonal entries. The Gershgorin
Circle Theorem then states that all its eigenvalues are strictly
positive, from which invertibility follows.
We first focus on the full information case and present the
equilibria in Theorems 2 and 3. Let C = diag(c1, . . . , cn).
Theorem 2. Under perfect price discrimination, the profit-
maximizing solution p∗ to the first stage game is
p∗ =
a
2︸︷︷︸
(1)
+CZ
a
2︸ ︷︷ ︸
(2)
−W>ΓZ a
4︸ ︷︷ ︸
(3)
+ ΓWZ
a
4︸ ︷︷ ︸
(4)
, (7)
Z =
[
2Γ +B + C −
(
W>Γ
2
+
ΓW
2
)]−1
.
The four components are interpreted as follows:
1) A constant term ai/2, c.f. ai in (1),
2) An additional cost that correlates with cost ci,
3) An incentive for strongly influential users W>Γ,
4) An additional cost for strongly influenced users ΓW .
The optimal consumption under this policy is
x∗ =
(
C +B + 2Γ− W
>Γ
2
− ΓW
2
)−1
a
2
. (8)
For the special case of symmetric networks, i.e. W = W>,
the optimal profit Π∗ becomes
Π∗ =
1
4
a>(C +B + 2Γ− ΓW )−1a. (9)
Theorem 3. Under complete information, i.e. the utility
knows ai and bi ∀ i ∈ I, the profit-maximizing single price
p∗u is
p∗u =
[
1− 1
>A−11
2 · 1> (A−1 +A−1CA−1)1
]
a¯ (10)
and the consumption equilibrium writes
x∗ = A−1
[
a−
(
1− 1
>A−11
2 · 1> (A−1 +A−1CA−1)1
)
a¯1
]
,
(11)
where A = B + 2Γ− ΓW and a¯ = ∑ni=1 ai/n.
Lemma 1. For symmetric networks, i.e. W = W>, the
single profit-maximizing price (10) and its corresponding
consumption (11) simplify to
p∗u =
1
n
n∑
i=1
p∗i (12a)
x∗u = (B + 2Γ− ΓW )−1 (a− a¯1) (12b)
+ (C +B + 2Γ− ΓW )−1 a¯
2
1.
By construction of the optimal prices and consumptions,
the optimal profit under a single price is less than under
perfect price discrimination, that is, Π∗u ≥ Π∗.
Next, for the incomplete information scenario and addi-
tional assumptions W = W> and C = cI , the utility can
approximate the profit-maximizing price as in Theorem 4.
Theorem 4. In the case of incomplete information, that is,
only the expectations of {ai}ni=1 and {bi}ni=1 are known
and denoted with E[a] and E[b], the optimal single profit-
maximizing price p˜∗u and the expected corresponding con-
sumption equilibrium E[x˜i] are bounded below by
p˜∗u ≥
E[a]
2
[
1 +
c
n
1> [2Γ + (2E[b] + c)I − ΓW ]−1 1
]
,
(13a)
E[x˜i] ≥
E[a]− p˜∗u,LB
n
· 1> (2Γ + 2E[b]I − ΓW )−1 1.
(13b)
where p˜∗u,LB denotes the lower bound on the single profit-
maximizing price p˜∗u (13a).
Theorem 5 (Profit Maximizing Price without Peer Effects).
In the case of incomplete information and in the absence of
any peer effects, the single profit-maximizing price pˆ∗ and
the expected user consumption E[xˆi] are
pˆ∗ =
E[b] + c
2E[b] + c
E[a], (14a)
E[xˆ∗i ] =
E[a]
2(2E[b] + c)
∀ i ∈ I. (14b)
III. THEORETICAL STATEMENTS
We next seek to analyze under what conditions the aggre-
gate consumption across all users is less than in the absence
of peer effects, which is a desirable goal from the energy
efficiency perspective.
Theorem 6. If ai =: a, bi =: b, and γi =: γ ∀ i ∈ I, and
Assumption 1 holds, then x∗i (4) is strictly monotonically
decreasing in γ, independent of the network topology W .
Theorem 6 is interesting because identical consumers will
reduce their optimal consumption compared to the case of
no peer effects, even though x∗i = x
∗
j ∀ i, j ∈ I and hence
the peer effect term γixi
(∑
j∈I wijxj − xi
)
is zero.
Theorem 7 (Influence of High Consumer). Given that
wij =
(∑
j∈I 1wij>0
)−1
∀ i ∈ I, that is, all connections
are of equal weight, and bi =: b and γi =: γ ∀ i ∈ I.
Define the set of users N := {i ∈ I \ j} with the
characteristic ai − pi =: α ∀ i ∈ N . Further, let j be a
“high consumer”, that is, aj − pj =: α¯ > nα. Denote the
set of all neighbors of j as Cj := {i ∈ N | wij > 0}. Then,
independent of the network topology, for all users i ∈ Cj ,
x∗i is increasing for small enough values of γ whereas x
∗
j is
strictly monotonically decreasing in γ.
Let mi denote the number of neighbors of consumer i.
Theorem 7 can be restated as in Lemma 2.
Lemma 2. x∗i , i ∈ Cj is increasing for small enough values
of γ if α¯ ≥ mj + 1. Equivalently, if α¯ = kα, k ∈ N, only
the subset {i ∈ Cj | mi ≤ k − 1}, i.e. the set of users
with fewer than k − 1 neighbors, shows an initial increase
in consumption as a function of γ.
Theorem 7 and Lemma 2 describe conditions on the
average consumption of any particular user’s neighbors to
observe a “boomerang effect”, given there is a unique “high”
consumer among a pool of users of identical characteristics.
Theorem 8 (Targeted Peer Effects). For a general setting
of n ≥ 2 users with non-identical parameters ai, bi and a
fixed price p among all users, exposing exactly two connected
users to the peer effect, w.l.o.g. referred to as users “1”
and “2”, reduces the sum of their consumptions under the
following conditions:
b1 ≤ (a1 − p) [4(b2 + γ)− γw12w21]
4(b2 + γ)
n∑
j=3
w1jxj + 2w12
(
a2 − p+ γ
n∑
j=3
w2jxj
)
(15a)
b2 ≤ (a2 − p) [4(b1 + γ)− γw12w21]
4(b1 + γ)
n∑
j=3
w2jxj + 2w21
(
a1 − p+ γ
n∑
j=3
w1jxj
)
(15b)
where xj , j ∈ {3, . . . , n} is given by xj = (aj − p)/(2bj).
For the special case of n = 2, this condition reads
b1 ≤ (a1 − p) (4b2 + 3γ)
2(a2 − p) and b2 ≤
(a2 − p) (4b1 + 3γ)
2(a1 − p)
Theorem 8 states that if two connected users both receive
notifications of their neighbors’ consumption, the sum of
their consumptions decreases as long as they are not “too
different” from each other and their neighbors. Thus, the total
consumption of a network of users correlates negatively with
the number of users given the treatment. Analogous bounds
can be found for exposing more than two users to the peer
effect at the expense of notational ease.
Finally, we investigate the case of incomplete informa-
tion about the network structure for the case of symmetric
networks, i.e. W = W>. It is assumed that the monopolist
only knows an approximation of W , denoted with W˜ , where
W˜ = W˜>. Under perfect price discrimination, the utility
can set profit-maximizing prices in the first stage of the
game, assuming that users’ consumption x˜ in the first stage
is determined according to W˜ . The real consumption x∗,
however, follows the actual W (which is unknown to the
utility). Theorem 9 provides a lower bound on the ratio of
the optimal expected profit under network uncertainty to the
profit obtainable under perfect network information.
Theorem 9 (Uncertainty in W ). Assume that W = W>
and Γ = γI, γ ≥ 0. If the monopolist has access only to
the estimate W˜ with W˜ = W˜>, then, under perfect price
discrimination, the ratio of optimal expected profit Π˜∗ to
profit Π∗ under perfect knowledge of W is bounded below:
Π˜∗
Π∗
≥ λmin(C +B + 2Γ− ΓW )
λmax(C +B + 2Γ− ΓW ) + γ‖W − W˜‖2
, (16)
where ‖ · ‖2 is the Euclidian matrix norm.
For the edge case W˜ = 0, we have ‖W‖2 = 1 due to the
well-known fact that the maximal eigenvalue of an adjacency
matrix is the degree of the graph. Due to row normalizations
of W , the degree is 1, which corresponds to the eigenvector 1
associated with eigenvalue 1. To qualitatively show that the
bound (16) becomes tighter as W˜ approaches W , observe
that ‖W − W˜‖2 corresponds to the largest singular value
of W − W˜ , which is identical to its spectral radius because
W−W˜ is Hermitian. Finally, the Gershgorin Circle Theorem
states that every eigenvalue of W − W˜ lies within at least
one of the disks that is centered at the origin, each of which
has radius Ri =
∑
j 6=i |wij − w˜ij |. As wij → w˜ij , Ri → 0.
To illustrate the bound (16), let n = 24 and W ∈ R24×24
be the ground truth interaction matrix of 12 randomly chosen,
fully connected users, whose parameters ai, bi, and ci ∀ i ∈ I
are randomly drawn from appropriate distributions. Assum-
ing that the monopolist knows that 12 out of 24 users are
fully connected, we iterate through all
(
24
12
)
combinations and
calculate ‖W˜ −W‖2 and the profit bound (16) as a function
of the number of correct user assignments, where we take the
mean across any particular number of correct assignments.
As the number of correct assignments increases, the metric
for the mismatch between W and W˜ , namely ‖W˜ −W‖2
decreases, whereas the profit bound increases, see Figure 1.
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
Number of Correct Guesses
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
‖W˜
−
W
‖ 2
Uncertainty of Interaction Matrix
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
Number of Correct Guesses
0.90
0.92
0.94
0.96
0.98
1.00
Π˜
∗ /
Π
∗
Bounds on Monopolist Profit
Profit Ratio
Lower Bound
Fig. 1: ‖W − W˜‖2 for 12 fully connected users embedded in a network of
n = 24 customers, γ = 0.05.
Theorem 10 (Efficiency). The consumption equilibrium x∗
(8) is inefficient as the social welfare S attained at (8) is
suboptimal. Specifically, x∗i < x
o
i ∀ i ∈ I, where xo denotes
the consumption that maximizes social welfare, which reads
xo =
(
C +
B
2
+ Γ− W
>Γ
2
− ΓW
2
)−1
a
2
. (17)
Allocating users per-unit subsidies si = (bi + γi)x2i /2
(Pigouvian Subsidy) can restore the social optimum.
IV. COMPARISON OF PRICING SCHEMES
A. Network Topologies
In the remainder of this paper, we assume users to be
connected to each other through one of the basic network
topologies displayed in Figure 2.
13 4
2 1
3 4
2 1
3 4
2
Fig. 2: Basic network architectures for n = 4: Fully connected, star, ring
B. Simulation
We now simulate the consumption and price equilibria
as well as the profit of the monopolist as a function of
the network strength parameter γ under the following three
pricing scenarios:
• Case 1: Monopolist has complete information of a and
b and sets prices with perfect price discrimination (7);
• Case 2: Monopolist has complete information of a and
b and sets the profit-maximizing single price (10);
• Case 3: Monopolist has access only to E[a] and E[b]
and sets the lower bound on the single price (13a).
We simulate a network of n = 10 fully connected users
with ai and bi randomly drawn from uniform distributions
with support [8, 12] and [0.75, 1.25], respectively. The cost
is set to ci = 2 for all users. As the results for the star and
ring network are qualitatively similar to the fully connected
network, we omit discussions of these cases. The optimal
prices for each of the cases (1)-(3) are then calculated, which
fixes the users’ consumptions and the monopolist’s profit.
Repeating this process 10,000 times and taking the mean
across all iterations yields the characteristics in Figure 3.
As expected, the profit under perfect price discrimination
(7) exceeds the profit obtained with cases (2) and (3), where,
somewhat surprisingly, setting the lower bound on the prices
(case (3)) does not give up too much profit, compared to
case (2). This indicates that the lower bound on the optimal
price (13a) is “close” to the actual optimum, which is proven
by the second subplot, from which it follows that (13a) falls
short of (10) by less than < 1%.
Consequently, the lower price bound (13a) results in a
higher average user consumption than in case (2), which
directly follows from the consumption equilibrium (4). The
average user consumption under perfect price discrimination
is sandwiched between cases (2) and (3).
Lastly, the maximum user consumption for perfect price
discrimination is about 30% lower than in cases (2) and
(3), which has beneficial side-effects on grid operation.
This observation also motivates the heuristic user-selection
algorithm presented in the next section.
V. PROFIT MAXIMIZATION WITH USER SELECTION
A. Problem Formulation
We now seek to answer the following question: Given
the single, exogenous price p and the parameters {ai}ni=1
and {bi}ni=1 sampled from distributions with means E[a] and
E[b], respectively and are known to the monopolist, which
users should be targeted to maximize profit? This situation
can arise if the utility is obligated to charge customers at a
0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30
55
60
65
Monopolist Profit Π
0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30
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Single Price for Cases 2 and 3
0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30
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Perfect Price Discrimination
Complete Information, Single Price
Incomplete Information, Single Price Bound
0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30
Interaction strength γ
1.50
1.75
2.00
2.25
Maximum User Consumption
Fig. 3: Profit of monopolist, single prices (10) and (13a), average user
consumption, and maximum consumption under perfect price discrimination
(green), single pricing under complete information (10) (yellow), and single
pricing under incomplete information (13a) (red). 10,000 iterations, a ∼
unif[8, 12], b ∼ unif[0.75, 1.25], ci = 2 ∀ i ∈ I.
rate p per unit of electricity and only wants to spend a limited
budget on informing users about their peers’ behavior. In
other words, which best subset of all users should be exposed
to the peer effect such that the utility achieves maximum
profit under exogenous price p? The profit maximizing
problem of the utility thus writes
maximize
δ1,...,δn
n∑
i=1
pxi − cix2i
subject to x = (B + 2∆Γ−∆ΓW )−1 (a− p1)
n∑
i=1
δi = m, δi ∈ {0, 1}
(18)
where ∆ = diag(δ1, . . . , δn) and δi = 1 and δi = 0
denote that user i is targeted or non-targeted, respectively.
This is an NP-hard Mixed Integer Quadratically Constrained
Program (MIQCP) due to the binary constraint to expose
exactly m, 0 ≤ m ≤ n users to the network effect and the
quadratic objective, and so (18) does not admit a closed form
solution. An analytical solution requires exhaustive search,
which is computationally infeasible for any real network of
users. Therefore, we resort to the following heuristic which
was hinted at at the end of Section IV: Given the user
parameters a and b and the single price p, we first compute
the consumptions in the absence of any network effects,
denoted with x˜ = B−1(a − p1). Next, we calculate the
optimal consumptions with the expectations of E[a] and E[b],
which we denote with E[x]. Lastly, the pairwise differences
|E[x]−x˜i| are put into a sorted list, and the heuristic selection
algorithm returns the indices of the m largest values in this
list. That is, ∆h = diag(δh,1, . . . , δh,n), where δh,i = 1 if
consumer i belongs to the set of the m largest |E[x] − x˜i|,
and δh,i = 0 otherwise.
The idea of this heuristic is motivated by Theorem 7,
according to which a high consumer in a network of low
consumers can result in a consumption increase of low
consumers. Since the user parameters are sampled from
a finite distribution, a single price on non-identical users
always results in suboptimal profit, but approaches optimality
as users become more similar. Exposing the highest and
lowest consumers (measured against E[x]) to the network
effect nudges high users (low users) to consume less (more),
thereby making the users more similar in their consumption,
which in turn increases the utility’s profit.
Further, the fact that the maximum user consumption
under perfect price discrimination (which achieves notably
better profit than single pricing, see Figure 3) is about 30 %
lower than under single pricing corroborates the notion of
exposing high consumers to the peer effects. According to
Theorem 7, such users reduce their consumption in response
to the peer effect, which reduces the maximum user con-
sumption to increase profit.
The utility needs to find the sweet spot between the
following two extremes: Targeting too few users results in a
suboptimal increase in profit. On the other hand, according
to Theorem 8, targeting too many users leads to an overall
consumption decrease because targeting a customer whose
neighbors are already exposed to the network causes the
neighbors to reduce their consumption further.
Note that this heuristic neither takes into account the
interaction matrix W nor the fact whether the deviation of
the actual consumption from the expected one is positive or
negative, and so it could be improved by running a classifi-
cation algorithm on the features |E[x]− x˜i|+, |E[x]− x˜i|−,
and γix˜i
(∑
j∈I wij x˜j − x˜i
)
.
B. Simulation
We let ci = 2, n = 10 as in Section IV and analyze
all three network topologies depicted in Figure 2. ai and
bi are sampled from the same uniform distributions. We
set the exogenous price as the profit-maximizing price in
the absence of peer effects (14a), from which the expected
consumption E[x] is determined with (14b). The analytical
solution to the MIQCP (18) is determined with Gurobi
[17]. We repeat this calculation 10,000 times and take the
mean across all iterations. To describe the performance of
the heuristic, we define the performance metric S as follows:
Sm =
Πhm −ΠE
Π∗m −ΠE
· 100%, (19)
where Π∗m and Π
h
m denote the profit under the analytical
solution of (18) and the heuristic with m targeted users,
respectively. ΠE denotes the profit in the absence of any peer
effects (m = 0) achieved with exogenous price p where the
users consume according to x˜ = B−1(a− p1). Sm captures
the fraction of the heuristic’s achieved profit improvement of
the total possible improvement.
Figure 4 shows the objective for the heuristic Πh (solid
lines) and analytical solution Π∗ (colored dashed line) for all
network topologies as a function of m. The expected profit
with m = 0 follows by taking the expectation of the profit
E[Π]m=0 = n · Ea∼U [8,12]Eb∼U [0.75,1.25]
[
px− cx2] ∣∣∣
x= a−p2b
,
which is depicted as the black dashed line. Further, the
percentage of cases where the heuristic selects the identical
subset of users as the analytical solution is depicted in the
second subplot. Sm and the maximum user consumption as
a function of m are provided in the third and fourth subplot,
respectively.
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Fig. 4: Average profit, percentage of optimal choice of heuristic, regret, and
average infinity norm of consumption for the utility’s profit maximization
problem under the single price (10). 10,000 iterations, a ∼ unif[8, 12], b ∼
unif[0.75, 1.25], ci = 2.
For all network topologies, it can be seen that the optimal
solution to (18) achieves an increase in profit by ≈ 1%
for m ∈ {2, 3, 4} compared to the case of no targeting,
while at the same time reducing the peak consumption by
≈ 4%. The performance of the heuristic decreases in the
number of consumers targeted and reaches its minimum at
≈ 75%, ≈ 82%, and ≈ 90% for the ring, star, and fully
connected network, respectively. The percentage of optimal
choices across all 10,000 iterations is always > 22%. These
results suggest that the presented heuristic achieves a good
approximation of the optimal solution, which is NP-hard and
computationally intractable for larger, real-world networks.
VI. CONCLUSION
Motivated by home energy reports that benchmark the
consumption of individual users against their neighbors, we
proposed a two-stage game-theoretic model for a network
of electricity consumers, in which each consumer seeks to
optimize her individual utility function that includes a peer
effect term. Specifically, users derive positive utility from
consuming less energy than the average of their neighbors,
and vice versa. We investigated profit-maximizing pricing
schemes for the complete and incomplete information sce-
nario as well as for the single price and perfect price
discrimination case. We provided theoretical statements with
regard to overall consumption, efficiency, and profit under
network uncertainty. For the case of targeting only a sub-
set of all available consumers under an exogenous single
price, we formulated the monopolist’s profit maximization
problem. The resulting NP-hard optimization problem was
solved with a heuristic approach, which simply targets those
users who deviate most from the expected consumption
in the hypothetical absence of peer effects. Compared to
the analytical solution, this heuristic was shown to achieve
acceptable accuracy.
This work could be extended by incorporating time. In par-
ticular, if we allow the monopolist to also procure electricity
from the wholesale market whose prices are fluctuating, an
algorithmic and online treatment of this problem becomes
necessary. The goal then becomes to learn user preferences
and the network structure over time. Further, the selection
problem to target the most valuable users for the objective of
profit maximization calls for modeling peer effects in auction
settings, where the desired goal is to design a truthful and
incentive compatible mechanism to elicit user preferences.
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APPENDIX
Proof of Theorem 1
With Assumption 1, (4) follows by evaluating the first
order optimality condition of (1) and acknowledging that its
second derivative is strictly negative. Uniqueness of the Nash
Equilibrium follows from Topkis’ Theorem on supermodular
games [5], which holds due to the continuity of the payoff
functions (1) on the compact set R+ and increasing differ-
ences in (xi,x−i) as ∂
2ui
∂xi∂xj
≥ 0 ∀ i, j ∈ I.
Proof of Theorem 2
(7) is obtained by solving
maximize
p
p>x− x>Cx
subject to x = (B + 2Γ− ΓW )−1 (a− p)
(20)
and applying the Matrix Inversion Lemma for general ma-
trices A,U,C, V of appropriate dimensions:
(A+UCV )−1 = A−1−A−1U (C−1 + V A−1U)−1 V A−1.
The optimal profit Π∗ is obtained by plugging p∗ and x∗
into the utility function of the monopolist.
Proof of Theorem 3
(10) is obtained in the same fashion as (7):
maximize
p
p1>x− x>Cx
subject to x = (B + 2Γ− ΓW )−1 (a− p1)
Eliminating x from both equations and evaluating the first
order optimality condition with respect to p yields (10).
Proof of Theorem 4
To derive (13a), we first note that since W = W> and
C = cI , the profit maximizing solution under complete
information (7) simplifies to
p∗u =
1>a
2n
+ 1> [2Γ +B + cI − ΓW ]−1 ac
2n
.
After taking the expectation with respect to the random
variables {ai}ni=1 and {bi}ni=1 to obtain
p˜∗u =
E[a]
2
+
E[a]c
2n
Eb
[
1> [2Γ +B + cI − ΓW ]−1 1>
]
,
we first show convexity of the last term in
diag(2b1, . . . , 2bn). Define the matrices
D = Γ +
c
2
I − ΓW
2
+ α diag (2b1, . . . , 2bn) ,
E = Γ +
c
2
I − ΓW
2
+ (1− α) diag (2b¯1, . . . , 2b¯n) ,
where α ∈ (0, 1). D and E are clearly positive definite due to
the Levy-Desplanques Theorem [18]. It is then to be shown
that
g(X) := 1>X−11, X := (αD + (1− α)E)−1 ,
X := 2Γ +B + cI − ΓW
is a convex function on the domain of all positive definite
matrices. Using the Schur Decomposition, which states[
S T>
T U
]
 0⇔ S  T>U−1T,
and since positive definite matrices are convex,
α
[
1>D−11 1>
1 D
]
+ (1− α)
[
1>E−11 1>
1 E
]
=
[
α1>D−11+ (1− α)1>E−11 1>
1 αD + (1− α)E
]
 0,
This immediately shows convexity of g(X):
αg(D) + (1− α)g(E) = α1>D−11+ (1− α)1>E−11
≥ 1>(αD + (1− α)E)−11 = g(αD + (1− α)E).
Finally, applying Jensen’s inequality in the multivari-
ate case on the multivariate random variable Y :=
diag(2b1, . . . , 2bn), we obtain
EY [g(X)] ≥ g (EY [X]) ,
from which (13a) follows directly.
Proof of Theorem 5
Under the given conditions, it follows immediately that
E[x∗1] = . . . = E[x∗n]. With this constraint, taking the ex-
pectation of (4) yields E[x∗(p)] as a function of p. Plugging
E[x∗(p)] into the utility’s profit function (2) and taking the
expectation with respect to a and b allows to compute the
optimal uniform price p∗ (14b). Next, setting p = p∗ in
E[x∗(p)] yields (14b).
Proof of Theorem 6
Taking the derivative of (5) with respect to γ yields:
dx
dγ
= − 1
4γ(b+ γ)
K−1F−1(a− p), γ > 0
where we used the abbreviations
K :=
(
I − γ
(2b+ 2γ)
W
)
, F :=
(
I +
b
γ
(2I −W )−1
)
.
K is a strictly diagonally dominant M-Matrix because it can
be expressed in the form sI−B with s = 1 and has negative
off-diagonal elements [19]. This special property guarantees
that its inverse exists and is strictly diagonally dominant and
entrywise positive. F is strictly diagonally dominant with
positive off-diagonal entries, because (2I −W )−1 is an M-
Matrix. The Levy-Desplanques Theorem [18] then implies
that F−1 exists, is diagonally dominant, and possesses non-
negative diagonal elements. Despite the possible negativity
of its off-diagonal elements, we show that the row sums of
K−1F−1 are positive. Take, for example the i-th row sum:
n∑
j=1
(K−1F−1)ij =
n∑
j=1
n∑
s=1
K−1is F
−1
sj =
n∑
s=1
K−1is F
−1
ss +
n∑
s=1
K−1is
n∑
j=1,j 6=s
F−1sj >
n∑
s=1
K−1is F
−1
ss −
n∑
s=1
K−1is F
−1
ss = 0.
Together with ai > pi ∀ i ∈ I (see Assumption 1), this
shows that dxdγ < 0 for γ > 0.
Proof of Theorem 7
Define L := (2I −W ), which is a diagonally dominant
matrix. Evaluating dxdγ at γ = 0 yields
dx
dγ
∣∣∣
γ=0
= −1
4
(2I −W )(a− p) = −1
4
Lα, (21)
where α is the column vector of all {αi | i ∈ I}. Evaluating
this derivative for user i 6= j, i ∈ Cj yields
−4dxi
dγ
∣∣∣
γ=0
= Liiα+ Lijα¯+
∑
k∈I\{i,j}
Likα
= 2α− α¯
n− 1 −
(n− 2)α
n− 1
< 2α− nα
n− 1 −
(n− 2)α
n− 1 = 0.
Hence we have dxidγ
∣∣∣
γ=0
> 0. On the other hand, for the
“high” consumer j, the derivative reads
−4dxj
dγ
∣∣∣
γ=0
= Ljjα+
∑
k∈I\j
Ljkα = 2α− n− 2
n− 1α > 0,
which completes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 2
The proof is similar to the one used for Theorem 7. For
each user i, i ∈ I \ j, the derivative reads
−4dxi
dγ
∣∣∣
γ=0
= 2α− kα
mi
− mi − 2
mi − 1α =
α(mi − k)
mi − 1
≤ (k − 1)− k
mi − 1 α < 0.
For user j, we have
−4dxj
dγ
∣∣∣
γ=0
= 2α− α
mj − 1 =
2mj − 1
mj − 1 α > 0.
Proof of Theorem 8
From Theorem 5, any user j with index 3, . . . , n, given
the price p, consumes (aj−p)/(2bj). To find x∗1 and x∗2, we
solve (4) for users 1 and 2:[
2(b1 + γ) −γw12
−γw21 2(b2 + γ)
] [
x∗1
x∗2
]
=
[
a1 − p+ γ
∑n
j=3 w1jxj
a2 − p+ γ
∑n
j=3 w2jxj
]
Comparing x∗1 +x
∗
2 to the consumptions without peer effect,
that is, (a1 − p)/(2b1) + (a2 − p)/(2b2) yields the desired
inequalities. For the special case n = 2, note that w12 =
w21 = 1 and w2j , j ≥ 3 as well as w1j , j ≥ 3, are zero.
Proof of Theorem 9
The optimal pricing vector p˜∗ under network uncertainty
and its corresponding consumption vector x˜∗ can be deter-
mined by solving (20) (with W = W˜ ) with respect to p.
x˜∗ is then determined by plugging p˜∗ back into (4). Let
F := B+ 2Γ−ΓW , F˜ := λ+ 2Γ−ΓW˜ . Then p˜ and x˜ are
p˜∗ = a− F˜ (C + F˜ )−1a/2,
x˜∗ = F−1F˜ (C + F˜ )−1a/2.
The optimal profit Π˜∗ = p˜∗>x˜∗ − x˜∗>Cx˜∗ can then be
expressed as follows:
Π˜∗ =
1
4
a>(C + F˜ )−1a+O(γ2) ≥ 1
4
a>(C + F˜ )−1a.
Using the definition of Rayleigh quotients [18], we thus
obtain the following ratio on the profit under uncertainty:
Π˜∗
Π∗
≥ a
>(C + F˜ )−1a
a>(C + F )−1a
≥ λmin((C + F˜ )
−1)
λmax((C + F )−1)
.
(C + F˜ ) as well as (C + F ) are symmetric positive
definite matrices due to their diagonal dominance with
nonpositive off-diagonal elements. Hence the eigenvalues
of their inverses are strictly positive. Utilizing the identity
λmin(A)
−1 = 1/λmax(A) for any nonsingular matrix A, and
‖A + B‖ ≤ ‖A‖ + ‖B‖ (a fundamental property of matrix
norms), further simplifications yield
Π˜∗
Π∗
≥ λmin(C + F )
λmax(C + F˜ )
=
λmin(C + F )
‖C + F + γ(W − W˜ )‖2
≥ λmin(C + F )
λmax(C + F ) + γ‖(W − W˜ )‖2
,
where we used the fact that for a symmetric positive
definite matrix A, we have ‖A‖2 ≡
√
λmax(A>A) =√
λmax(A2) = λmax(A).
Proof of Theorem 10
The social welfare S is the sum of all users’ and the
monopolist’s utility:
S =
∑
i∈I
aixi − bix2i − cix2i + γixi
∑
j∈I
wijxj − xi
 .
For each i ∈ I, minimizing S with respect to xi yields
dS
dxi
= ai − 2(bi + ci + γi)xi + γi
∑
j∈I
wijxj + γi
∑
j∈I
wjixi,
where the last term on the right hand side signifies the
externalities user i imposes on its neighbors, but which are
unaccounted for in the individual users’ utility maximization.
Solving for xi and vectorizing the equation yields (17).
To show that xoi > x
∗
i for γ > 0, it suffices to show that
A = (C+B/2+Γ−W>Γ/2−ΓW/2)−1 is entrywise greater
that B = (C+B+2Γ−W>Γ/2−ΓW/2)−1. By performing
Gauss-Jordan Elimination on A and B and exploiting the fact
that A and B are diagonally dominant matrices with positive
values on the diagonal and negative off-diagonal entries, this
claim follows.
To show that a Pigouvian Subsidy of si = 12 (bi + γi)x
2
i
restores social welfare, note that the user’s utility function
uoi now reads
uoi = aixi −
1
2
bix
2
i − pixi + γixi
∑
j∈I
gijxj − 1
2
xi
 .
The solution to the subgame-perfect equilibrium under the
new user utility uoi yields x
o
i .
